Boundedly Rational Decision Emergence - A General Perspective and Some Selective Illustrations by Werner Güth






Phone: +49 (89) 9224-1410/1425
Fax: +49 (89) 9224-1409
http://www.CESifo.de
________________________
* I gratefully acknowledge helpful comments by Rainer Hegselmann, Reinhard Selten, Eric
van Damme, my associate editor Peter Lunt as well as by two anonymous referees.
Financial support by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (SFB 373) is gratefully
acknowledged.
BOUNDEDLY RATIONAL DECISION




Working Paper No. 330CESifo Working Paper No. 330
August 2000
BOUNDEDLY RATIONAL DECISION EMERGENCE  –
A GENERAL PERSPECTIVE AND SOME
SELECTIVE ILLUSTRATIONS
Abstract
A general framework is described specifying how boundedly rational
decision makers generate their choices. Starting from a “Master
Module” which keeps an inventory of previously successful and
unsuccessful routines several submodules can be called forth which
either allow one to adjust behavior (by “Learning Module” and
“Adaptation Procedure”) or to generate new decision routines (by
applying “New Problem Solver”). Our admittedly bold attempt is
loosely related to some stylized experimental results.








Human decision makers can at best be boundedly rational. The practical impos-
sibility of rational decision making is, for instance, obvious for chess whose ﬁnite
variety of board situations is too large for human decision makers and modern
chess computers. For economic choice situations similar problems can result.
It is easy to criticize the (in economics) traditional assumption of perfect decision
rationality without oﬀering something new. A lot is known about boundedly ra-
tional decision behavior. One idea is to reduce the multiplicity of goals and to
measure the achievement of the remaining goals in discrete steps, the so-called
aspiration levels, i.e. to substitute optimizing by satisﬁcing (Simon, 1976, Sauer-
mann and Selten, 1959, Tietz, 1988). Past experiences may help to explain behav-
ior in addition to forward looking reasoning. Also inessential aspects (the frame
or the presentation of a situation) can inﬂuence behavior by triggering diﬀerent
concerns (see, for instance, the decomposed prisoners’ dilemma experiments by
Pruitt, 1967, and the more general studies inspired by Tversky and Kahneman,
1986). And there is an impressive theory of how to use induction in problem
solving (e.g. Holland et al., 1986).
Still, the many pieces (of the complex mosaic) do not provide a complete picture
of the theory of boundedly rational decision making. In experimental economics
one arbitrarily relies on particular aspects, e.g. on avoiding to decide repeatedly
by committing once and forever to certain principles like reciprocity (Fehr et al.,
1993), on aspiration adaptation in concession bargaining (Tietz, 1988), and on
directional learning in repeated decision making, e.g. Selten and Buchta (1998).
What is urgently needed is some general perspective how some or — hopefully
— the most important facts about bounded rationality can be combined into a
dynamic model of decision emergence (Holland et al., 1986, also claim to oﬀer
“only a framework”).
Our dynamic model of decision emergence is partly speculative in nature and
partly supported by empirical, mostly experimental evidence. To limit the degree
1of speculating we narrow the scope of possible decision situations. We, for in-
stance, focus on choice problems with ordered choice sets, e.g. subsets of the real
numbers. Further restrictions will be mentioned when they are needed. Still we
suggest only a general framework. For a general algorithm1 much more has to be
known about how people decide and how they combine their various routines of
making a decision. We may never come that far. To illustrate our general model of
decision emergence we can only refer to some selected experimental choice prob-
lems and their stylized results (for a more general survey see the Handbook of
Economic Psychology, van Raaij, van Veldhoven and Wärneryd, 1988, and the
Handbook of Experimental Economics, Kagel and Roth, 1995).
Many of the ideas have been discussed already in the psychological literature,
especially in the ﬁeld of cognitive psychology (e.g. Neisser, 1967, 1976, and 1987,
Minsky, 1975, Reed, 1973, and Payne, Bettman and Johnson, 1993, to name a
few). This may question the novelty of our approach, but supports its claim to
provide a natural framework for structuring and formalizing at least qualitatively
the process of isolated and interactive decision making. And to import psycho-
logical ideas into experimental or behavioral economics deﬁnitely is very much
needed (see Selten, 1991).
Quite often it is diﬃcult to relate the problems, discussed in cognitive psychology
(e.g. the question of what deﬁnes a chair or a table in the literature on cate-
gorization, see Neisser, 1987), to those studied in (experimental and behavioral)
economics (compare, for instance, the “problem solving” tasks in Holland et al.
(1986) and those discussed below). In (economic) psychology (see van Raaij, van
Veldhoven, and Wärneryd, 1988) one is more interested in how people perceive
and experience certain economic phenomena like inﬂation or unemployment. Such
evidence often oﬀers little guidance when exploring how decision makers perceive
an economic choice model relying on mathematically deﬁned structural relation-
ships.
1Neo-classical theory or game theory does not oﬀer a general algorithm either. Only when
knowing the preferences of all parties, their beliefs etc. can one derive the solution behavior.
Specifying these aspects for all possible decision problems will never be possible.
2In the following two sections we ﬁrst describe the “Master Module” and then
its submodules. Section 4 discusses experimental choice problems in light of the
general framework which were selected to illustrate its submodules. The Conclud-
ing Remarks relate our perspective for developing general theories of boundedly
rational decision emergence to other approaches.
2. The master module
Our attempt to describe how a decision evolves suﬀers from two major weak-
nesses: It is only casually supported by available evidence, and it is partly not
speciﬁc enough to provide a generally applicable algorithm how to come up with
as p e c i ﬁc choice (even general methods like “means-ends analysis” (Newell, 1969)
are far from oﬀering a rigorous algorithm without specifying what is a goal and
which operators are adequate, see also Holland et al., 1986). In our view, these
weaknesses are, however, inescapable for any general attempt: There is simply
not enough evidence to support all assumptions.
By special research attempts one may provide the necessary evidence and test
some of our more speciﬁc assumptions, e.g. by methods of tracing the cognitive
process like think aloud-studies or by recording group discussions. If this questions
some of our more speciﬁc conjectures, our framework should be ﬂexible enough
to allow the suggested substitution.
The need of such a general framework can be illustrated by questions like: Does
the supporting evidence for one speciﬁc concept question other concepts? How
can one combine rather unrelated concepts and how can inconsistent ideas be
incorporated, e.g. by limiting their scope? Without a general framework for
imagining the process of decision emergence such questions can hardly be an-
swered or not even addressed. A general framework must not deny diversity in
behavior, but it should suggest when to expect what, i.e. it should oﬀer some
inspiration which concept will dominate behavior under which circumstances. So,
3for instance, equity theory usually explains well distribution behavior in reward
allocation (Mikula, 1977, Shapiro, 1975), but is hardly useful in market settings.
Our general framework is built on rather intuitive ideas like a behavioral reper-
toire, representing past experiences and guaranteeing path dependence as (genet-
ical or cultural) evolution and learning theories: We are not born as grown up
decision makers.2 Developing as a decision maker typically means to rely on pre-
vious experiences. It further involves rather natural cognitive considerations like
qualitative and quantitative resemblance and cognitive adaptation in the form of
gradually adding complexity.
The “Master Module”, described as a ﬂow chart in Figure II.1, assumes that one
ﬁrst checks the behavioral repertoire in order to gain from former experiences
(induction based on past experiences is also studied thoroughly by Holland et al.,
1986). The behavioral repertoire c o u l db es e e na sac o l l e c t i o no fg o o da n d
bad decision rules, possibly qualitative and quantitative ones, for certain classes
of choice problems, e.g. for buying a used commodity like a second hand car from
somebody unknown.
After the decision one usually tries to check whether or not the choices made
were reasonable. Such an ex post-consideration may, of course, result in post-
decisional regret which, in our view, can be very meaningful. It improves the
behavioral repertoire in the sense that in future one will shy away from such
unreasonable choices. As a matter of fact it is the behavioral repertoire of highly
experienced decision makers what justiﬁes their higher income in spite of the ﬁerce
competition on the market for top managers (one could try to justify along these
lines the empirical fact, see Jensen and Murphy, 1990, that the income of CEOs
(Chief Executive Oﬃcers) is only weakly related to business success).
2The traditional view in evolutionary biology (see, for instance, Maynard Smith, 1982)
and in evolutionary game theory (see the survey by Hammerstein and Selten, 1994, as well
as by Weibull, 1995) assumes that all essential choices are genetically determined, i.e. already
made when being born. This may be true for some basic instincts like crying when hungry,
thirsty or hurt which we want to neglect. For the choice problems we have in mind, the way
of how a decision emerges can depend, however, on many phenotypical aspects which one can
summarize under cultural evolution. Cultural evolution is by no means restricted to the
human world. The same kind of apes living in similar environments, for instance, may or may
not develop as nut crackers what requires a lot of teaching and training.
4Figure II.1: The Master Module of decision emergence
A new decision problem, especially some of the experimental choice paradigms
may not closely resemble previous choice problems. According to Figure II.1
the decision maker will then apply the submodule “New Problem Solver” which
will be described below. Whether or not a new decision problem is “similar”
to a previously experienced one is judged by referring to the cognitive model,
developed for the previous decision problem. If all structural relationships of the
cognitive model are present in both situations3, they can be viewed as similar. If
3Notice that two situations, which are equally structured, e.g. in the sense of strategic equiv-
alence, can nevertheless be diﬀerently perceived (see Pruitt, 1967, for an early demonstration).
This clearly can account for (individual diﬀerences in) presentation or framing eﬀects.
5such a resemblance exists, it may, however, be only a qualitative one. If so, the
decision maker is assumed to apply the “Adaptation Procedure” whereas he can
rely on the “Learning Module” when quantitative resemblance is granted (and
one confronts the situation repeatedly).
According to Figure II.1 one ﬁrst looks at a class of situations which are qualita-
tively equal. Here qualitative resemblance has to rely on cognition. Two decision
problems are perceived as qualitatively similar (such similarities are also a
problem in artiﬁcial intelligence when deﬁning intelligent agents what does not
exclude social (e.g. Bates et al., 1997) choice problems; the BDI-architecture, for
instance, describes agents by their Beliefs, Desires, and Intentions (Fischer et
al., 1997)) if their cognitive representations contain the same structural relation-
ships4. Only when such a qualitative resemblance exists, one investigates also the
quantitative similarity of the new choice problem and the previous ones. Quanti-
tative similarity should be deﬁned in view of the prominence structure of open
and closed scales (see, for instance, Albers and Albers, 1983, Rubinstein, 1988,
and Tversky, 1977) which might very well depend on the context (when numbers
measure %-probabilities rather than monetary units, an increase from 99 to 100
appears more essential). In general, quantitative similarity can prevail even in
case of minor quantitative diﬀerences.
The complexity of the “Master Module” is determined by the complexity of its
three submodules to which we now turn our attention. Our few selective illustra-
tions (see section 4 below) will hopefully illustrate that the main structure of the
“Master Module” is empirically sound.
3. The submodules
When describing the submodules we proceed from more to less speciﬁc resem-
blance, namely from qualitative and quantitative via purely qualitative ones to
4The fact that a certain decision routine will be only applied, when situations are at least
qualitatively similar, makes them domain speciﬁc. Since what is seen as qualitatively similar
depends on its mental representation, this allows for individual diﬀerences in the domains of
certain routines what might account for individual diﬀerences in behavior.
6not even qualitative ones. Thus the order of the submodules is “Learning Mod-
ule”, then “Adaptation Procedure”, and ﬁnally “New Problem Solver” which is a
slightly more complex submodule.
3.1. Learning
One confronts qualitatively and quantitatively the same choice problem, for in-
stance, in experiments where one repeatedly plays the same game with new part-
ners. Notice that playing repeatedly with the same partners may be seen as an
entirely diﬀerent choice problem. Here one might rely on a grand plan for the
whole future like “to start with cooperation and an intention to deviate from co-
operation towards the end” in repeated prisoners’ dilemma experiments with the
same partners. If such a repeated game with the same partners is played repeat-
edly with changing partners, “Learning” can, of course, again be applied (see, for
instance, Selten and Stöcker, 1986, who explore repeating a repeated game with
new partners).
Unlike in evolutionary game theory people’s decisions are not genetically or cul-
turally determined, but usually based on some basic cognitive model relating
the — likely — outcome to one’s own choice variable. In a ﬁrst price-auction5
one will, for instance, be aware of the fact that a higher bid will increase the
probability of winning, but also what one has to pay, namely one’s own higher
bid, in case of winning. To balance the two eﬀects would, however, require to
quantify them what might overburden a boundedly rational decision maker.
The “Learning Module” oﬀers an alternative by simply adjusting behavior in
the direction of those choices which would have been good in past decisions (see
Selten and Buchta, 1998, for repeated ﬁrst price auctions with changing partners).
Learning requires, of course, some cognitive model by which one can assess ex post
whether or not another decision would have been better (in a ﬁrst price-auction
this requires to understand the payoﬀ schedule).
5In a ﬁrst price auction the object is sold to the highest bidder at the price of his bid (see
Kagel, 1995, for a survey of auction experiments).
7There are many ways how a basic cognitive model can develop, e.g. by accepting
other persons’ views, or by applying one’s own “New Problem Solver”. Holland
et al. (1986) view mental models as a set of rules which are all of an “IF such
and such, THEN so-and-so”-form. Like basic concerns the basic rules are in most
situations quite obvious: In ultimatum bargaining6 (see Roth, 1995, for a
survey) the rule “IF the oﬀer is more generous, THEN acceptance is more likely”
is, for instance, most obvious. If such a cognitive model exists one can ex post
evaluate past decisions.
Some learning models (see, for instance, Bush and Mosteller, 1955, and Roth
and Erev, 1995) do not require much cognition, but rather assume that people tend
to repeat those choices more frequently which, in the past, were more rewarding
— sometimes this is called reinforcement or stimulus response-learning.
In situations where hardly anything is known or where the outcome is highly
stochastic or in complex decision tasks, discouraging any attempt to understand
the likely eﬀects of one’s own actions, one often will rely on stimulus response-
learning at least initially. Boundedly rational decision makers will, however, con-
tinuously try to develop simple cognitive ideas to understand why certain choices
imply certain results. Thus behavioral adaptation by reinforcement seems more
relevant for (rare) human decision problems where hardly anything can be known
or learned about the structure of the environment (see the experimental study of
Huck, Normann, and Oechssler, 1999, with little structural information).
If one is aware that a decision problem will come up frequently, Figure III.1
suggests an immediate feedback loop regardless whether or not one’s aspirations
were satisﬁed. Only the general experience with such repeated decision tasks is
then stored by employing the “Master Module”.
6How to divide a positive monetary amount among two individuals is determined by letting
one propose an ultimatum, i.e. a take it or leave it-oﬀer how to share, which the other can either
accept or reject (meaning conﬂict, i.e. 0-payoﬀsf o rb o t h ) .
8Figure III.1: “Learning Module”
9In repeated decisions with observable outcomes (see, for instance, Selten and
Buchta, 1998) one often can check whether there would have been a better choice.
If there exist many better choices, the selection of one of these remains open (one
may only know the direction of a better choice). This shows that no complete
algorithm is oﬀered. There are certain choices for which we do not state how they
emerge simply because we still do not understand thoroughly enough the dynamic
processes of generating them.
If Figure III.1 is applied to repeated choice making, the results may allow to
disprove the basic cognitive model. For this case the submodule “New Problem
Solver” in Figure III.3 describes how a decision maker adjusts to the experience
that his cognitive ideas are at odds with what has happened. One basic idea
of Figure III.1 is that of a hierarchy of cognitive models as suggested by
Güth (1995). One usually turns attention to more complex and cognitively more
demanding models only when it becomes evident that simpler models do not
comply with the facts. Of course, the more demanding considerations have to be
manageable.
The ﬁnal step in Figure II.1 (when having left the “Learning Module” by going
back to the “Master Module”) includes more general evaluations than just whether
the last chosen alternative passes an ex post-evaluation based on one’s own cog-
nitive model. One may, for instance, have experienced that “Learning” results in
poor success if compared with other ways of improving behavior, e.g. consulting
experts. And that may be kept in mind, e.g. by remembering to consult an expert
next time instead of trying to improve behavior by “Learning”.
3.2. Adaptation
Unlike in “Learning” where one may repeatedly encounter the same choice prob-
lem allowing to quantitatively adjust one’s behavior at least in the right direction,
“Adaptation Procedure” is applied when there is only a vague resemblance of the
new and the previously experienced decision situations.
10One example would be a ﬁrst or second7 price-auction with a new private value8.
But the resemblance could also be more dramatic: The bidder may, for instance,
have experiences with auctions, but not with fair division games9 where the
price is distributed among the bidders instead of being given to seller (see Güth,
1998). Whereas in the ﬁrst case the ﬁrst question in Figure III.2 will be conﬁrmed,
in the latter case it probably will be rejected although the two — at ﬁrst sight —
structurally diﬀerent bidding problems diﬀer in only one parameter, namely how
much one participates in the sales price. Especially when due to parameter values
of 0 certain structural relationships do not appear at all, any close resemblance
could be easily denied.
Adapting behavior to parameter changes in case of qualitatively similar choices
may not always be easy. In the case of ﬁrst price-auctions and changing private
values one might simply rely on the same proportion of underbidding. When,
however, bidding in a ﬁrst price — fair division game instead of an auction one
might want to change the degree of underbidding, e.g. by overbidding.
Here we refrain from elaborating “Adaptation to Changed Parameters” as a fur-
ther submodule. How this will or should be done by boundedly rational decision
makers may often depend crucially on the context and how it is cognitively per-
ceived (an interesting approach, inspired by the “intelligent agent”-approach of
artiﬁcial intelligence and by experimental data is Edmonds, mimeo). As in “Learn-
ing” one might only specify the direction of adaptation and leave it open how far
one adapts what might depend on the prominence structure (Albers and Albers,
1983).
7Unlike in ﬁrst price auctions the highest bidder does not pay what he bids, but the second
highest bid (see Vickrey, 1961, for an early analysis).
8The private value expresses how a bidder evaluates the object to be auctioned. Experi-
mentally such values are controlled by auctioning ﬁctitious objects which a bidder, when he
has bought “the object”, can only resell at a predetermined price (the private value) to the
experimenter.
9In a fair division game the bidders jointly own the object, e.g. like the partners of a joint
venture, and try to sell it to one of them. The price is then equally distributed among all
bidders.
11Figure III.2: The submodule “Adaptation Procedure”
When quantitative diﬀerences are essential or when a bad decision would be very
costly, e.g. in case of major investment choices, Figure III.2 denies to base one’s
decision on such a poor resemblance. Thus one tackles the choice problem in
essence as a newly arising decision task to which the submodule “New Problem
Solver” applies. In other words: Dramatic quantitative diﬀerences will be
treated like qualitative ones.
3.3. New Problem Solver
Facing a new problem is deﬁnitely the most challenging task when generating an
unambiguous choice by boundedly rational considerations. Examples of such sit-
12uations are rare. We usually encounter choice problems which either we ourselves
or others have experienced before.
An aircraft having to land on an icescraper with no food for the survivors except
for the dead bodies of those who did not survive may result in such a new and
unpleasant choice problem: should one try to save one’s own life by “cannibalism”
in spite of all moral obstacles? Also some experimental situations are rather
unusual, e.g. the reciprocity game10 studied by Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe
(1995). You hardly ever receive a payment from somebody who does not know
you and whom you do not know at all. If so, it usually will not be tripled and
one does not often have the chance to pay him something back.
In the terminology of Holland et al. (1986) one has to develop a mental model
for a new kind of decision task. This means to detect appropriate “rules”, i.e. IF
... THEN ...-conjectures, describing the relevant structural relationships. Only
after enough experiences one will learn which rules are really relevant. Here we
do not rely on the approach and terminology, suggested by Holland et al. (1986),
requiring an “inductive system” as well as an “evaluation mechanism” which also
w o u l dh a v et ob es p e c i ﬁed and justiﬁed.
10One of the two players (the contributor) can give the other (the receiver) some of his
monetary endowment. What the other receives is tripled, i.e. three times what has been given
to him. The receiver can ﬁnally send back any amount to the contributor which does not exceed
what he received.
13Figure III.3: The submodule “New Problem Solver”
14In general, Figure III.3 is an attempt to generalize the more speciﬁc approach for
generating ultimatum oﬀers (Güth, 2000). It starts by determining the basic con-
cerns — in case of ultimatum oﬀers how much one gets in case of agreement and
the chances of an agreement. Often — like in ultimatum bargaining — the basic con-
cerns are obvious although diﬀerent individuals with diﬀerent experiences might
disagree. In dictator giving11 some people might care for the well-being of the
recipient(s) whereas others might develop such an interest only after learning that
others care or after experiencing or imagining the frustration felt by recipient(s).
Here we do not oﬀer a general deﬁnition of what qualiﬁes as a basic concern.
A seller on a product market may, for instance, view market share, employment,
(unit) cost as his basic concerns. But he also may only care for the proﬁta si t
is implied by such variables. In any case a basic concern is an obvious and easily
observable goal variable which has to be clearly distinguished from utilities which
reﬂect subjective evaluations of a (prohibitively) more demanding nature. In the
spirit of Tversky, Sattath, and Slovic (1988) one could conjecture that in complex
situations basic concerns may often be selected by their relative prominence.
According to Figure III.3 one must check for a non-repeated decision task whether
one’s basic concerns are conﬂicting or not. In ultimatum bargaining a cognitive
model by which one can check whether basic concerns are conﬂicting is naturally
a model of responder behavior. Güth (2000), for instance, suggests that one will
simply distinguish a range of oﬀers which surely will be accepted, as well as a range
of oﬀers which surely will be rejected. This does not exclude an intermediate range
of oﬀers where one is not sure at all how likely they will be accepted. Thus the two
basic concerns are conﬂicting since the “unacceptable” oﬀe r sa r et h eo n e sw h i c h ,
in case of acceptance, yield more to the proposer.
Further questions to be resolved before a decision emerges relate to the cost of
a bad decision. In case of high costs one will not mind to invest more eﬀort in
11Whereas in ultimatum bargaining (see Footnote 6) the proposal can be rejected, in dictator
giving the other party has no veto power, i.e. the payoﬀ division which the proposer suggests,
is implemented.
15ﬁnding out what seems to be a “safe” decision, respectively in checking competing
models for their recommendation.
Even a new situation with novel structural relationships will not be viewed without
any relation to former experiences and background knowledge. In our view, such
information will help to infer the basic concerns and the relevant “rules”, i.e. IF
... THEN ...-statements (see also Holland et al., 1986, p. 22). Often there is no
alternative to following the advice oﬀered by such loosely related experiences and
such poor background information. If such advice is, however, viewed as rather
unreliable, one will pay more attention to immediate experiences. Past results
will usually have a more dramatic impact for choices in novel situations resulting
from the New Problem Solver-subroutine of Figure III.3.
4. Application to some experimental choice situations
The outline of decision emergence, given above, is far from providing a widely
applicable algorithm by which one can predict which choices will be made. Nev-
ertheless it is, in our view, important to combine the various pieces of what is
known about boundedly rational decision making. To demonstrate its potential
the general framework will be related to some selective experimental choice prob-
lems.
4.1. Learning and environmental knowledge
According to the “Master Module” one has to judge the qualitative and possi-
bly also the quantitative similarity of decision environments. Such a judgement
depends, of course, on what is known about one’s decision environment. In an
experiment one may just be aware of one’s options, but not at all whether one is
interacting with others in a deterministic or stochastic set up. Such a situation
may not be new. The “Master Module” may therefore avoid the “New Problem
Solver” and directly switch on the “Learning Module”.
16In case of repeated decisions the missing knowledge about one’s decision environ-
ment may be provided by past results. If not, the dynamic adjustment of behavior
and aspirations (see Figure III.1) will yield similar results like reinforcement
learning (Bush and Mosteller, 1955, Roth and Erev, 1995).
When deciding repeatedly one may not only observe the own past success, but
also the success of others in a related situation regardless whether one is or is not
interacting with them (think about a market experiment where all participants
may be monopolistic sellers or competitors). Here reinforcement learning will
often be substituted by imitation (see Vega-Redondo, 1997), i.e. by trying out
the behavior of the more successful others.
Both types of behavioral adjustment rely solely on information about past suc-
cess. Thus adapting to one’s decision environment is purely path dependent and
disregards deliberation in the sense of forward looking considerations, based on a
cognitive or mental model of the situation. How path dependent behavioral ad-
justments and forward looking considerations together can shape decision making
can be illustrated by experiments with multiple decision environments which one
confronts repeatedly. Before reporting the typical results of such studies we can
state
Remark 4.1: In repeated decision making experiments the type of dynamic ad-
justments depends on structural knowledge and the information feedback
where in case of no structural knowledge
• reinforcement learning dominates in case of pure information feedback about
own past success and
• imitation will be crucial if also the past success of others in related situations
can be observed.
With structural knowledge “Updating the cognitive representation by gradually
adding complexity” and “New problem solving” become more important.
17How structural knowledge leads to a more or less complete cognitive representation
and to comparisons of past choices with alternative decisions as suggested by the
“Learning Module” is, for instance, demonstrated by the evidence of directional
or qualitative learning (see, for example, Selten and Buchta, 1998, for ﬁrst price-
auctions and for search problems Edmonds, mimeo).
4.2. Robust learning
In robust learning experiments (see Güth, 1999, for a selective survey) a partici-
pant confronts repeatedly various decision environments about which he is com-
pletely informed. Thus he can engage in forward looking deliberation, observable
by adjustments to institutional changes, and in path dependent adaptation, mea-
surable when deciding repeatedly in the same institutional set up. According to
the “Master Module” one may ﬁrst apply the “New Problem Solver”, but will
later rely on the “Adaptation Procedure” or the “Learning Module” when facing
the same situation again and again. Instead of discussing this in general terms
let us illustrate robust learning by the study of Güth et al. (1999 a and b) who
explore competitive bidding behavior.
Assume a unique indivisible object, e.g. a piece of art, which is to be sold to one
of n competing bidders i =1 ,...,n.L e tvi denote bidder i’s true (private) value of
the object and bi = bi (vi) his (sealed) bid when vi is his valuation. One typically
will sell the object to the highest bidder. For the price p = p(b),w h i c ht h eh i g h e s t
bidder must pay in case of the bid vector b =( b1,...,bn), one can distinguish two
prominent rules, namely
• the 1st price-rule where p(b) equals the highest, i.e. the winning bid, and
• the 2nd price-rule where p(b) equals the second highest, i.e. the highest
non-winning bid.
18Another institutional variation concerns the ownership of the commodity. If an
outside seller owns the object and collects the price p = p(b), one speaks of an
auction.A fair division game refers to the situation where the group of n
bidders owns the object and shares equally the price p = p(b). Examples of
fair division games are a will (with n heirs) or dissolving a joint venture with n
partners, e.g. a divorce where n =2 .
In case of an auction bidder i earns nothing if his bid is not winning whereas his
proﬁti svi−p(b) otherwise. In a fair division game his proﬁti sp(b)/n if he does
not win and vi −(n − 1)p(b)/n otherwise, i.e. the price is shared equally among
the n bidders. Combining these two institutions with the two price-rules yields a
2 × 2-factorial design. In the experiment of Güth et al. (1999a and b) the true
values vi were (with equal probability) chosen from the set
{50,60,...140,150}.
Participants played three cycles consisting each of
- ﬁrst 3 plays of the 1st price-auction,
- t h e n3p l a y so ft h e2 n dp r i c e - a u c t i o n ,
- t h e n3p l a y so ft h e2 n dp r i c e - f a i rd i v i s i o ng a m e ,
- ﬁnally 3 plays of the 1st price-fair division game.
How our general framework could be applied in such a speciﬁca n dr a t h e rc o m p l e x
decision environment would require a much more speciﬁc algorithm. What we just
want to illustrate here is the evidence for both, forward looking deliberation and
path dependent adaptation. In Figure IV.1 the horizontal axis counts the rounds
of the 36 successive plays where always blocks of three rounds rely on the same,
commonly known rules (A.1, A.2, 1st, respectively 2nd price-auction; F.1, F.2,
1st, respectively 2nd price fair division game). The vertical axis gives the average
bids bi (vi) for the 11 possible values vi. Initially there is still some adjustment,
based on path dependence (see, for instance, the ﬁrst 3 rounds of the 2nd price-
auction), but later on there are nearly no learning tendencies when playing in the
same institutional set up repeatedly. Compared to this the signiﬁcant adjustments
to new rules are much more persistent, e.g. when switching from the 1st to the



























































































































































Figure IV.1: Evidence for forward looking deliberation and path dependent
adaptation
An interesting aspect in such an environment is whether behavioral changes are
applied locally, e.g. for one speciﬁcv a l u evi only, or globally in the sense of
adjusting all 11 bids (in the experiment bids had to be chosen before randomly
selecting vi). Whereas reinforcement learning or imitation as dynamic adjustments
with no or little deliberation seem to suggest local adaptation, causal models,
which are adjusted by incorporating more causal relationships if necessary, would
recommend global adjustments, e.g. in the 1st price-auction by adjusting the
degree of underbidding (vi − bi (vi))/vi for all 11 values vi.
Actually Figure IV.2 shows that participants usually have globally adjusted their
bid vectors where this tendency is stronger for auctions than fair division games12.
Separately for the four diﬀerent tasks and for all cases, when the bid vector has
12In fair division games one may apply other considerations for low values vi (where one may
want to increase the price) than for high values (where one may want to win).
20changed, it presents the frequency distribution over all possible numbers of ad-











































Figure IV.2: Evidence for global rather than local adjustments
Although Figure IV.1 suggests stronger eﬀects of adapting to new rules than
adjustments when playing the same rules repeatedly, there is strong evidence for
path dependent adaptation, too. For nearly all participants the earlier bid vectors
for the 4 game types converge to their last bid vectors for these games (see Güth
et al., 1999a). Together with the other results this justiﬁes
Remark 4.2: If one repeatedly plays the same commonly known rules, behav-
ior is strongly inﬂuenced by cognitively perceiving and updating the decision
e n v i r o n m e n ta sw e l la sb yl e a r n i n gi nv i e wo fp a s tr e s u l t s .
Of course, one ﬁnally will have to model how forward looking considerations and
path dependent adaptation together inﬂuence decision emergence, e.g. in a robust
21learning environment. What we just wanted to demonstrate here is that pure path
dependence (like in Roth and Erev, 1995) should be restricted to situations where
little or no information about the situation is available and that even complete
knowledge about one’s decision environment leaves room for adjusting to past
experiences, i.e. for path dependence.
4.3. Dictator giving
Dictator giving naturally arises when (with some valuable commodity, e.g. money)
well-equipped individuals are confronted with some less favorably endowed indi-
viduals. Most forms of charity clearly fall under this category. Usually those
who are better equipped will have earned their relatively better endowment, e.g.
by own previous eﬀorts as in the experiments of reward allocation13,e . g . b y
Shapiro (1975) and Mikula (1977).
To illustrate the diﬀerences between reward allocation and dictator giving with
randomly assigned roles consider an individual who played several dictator games
(see Bolton and Zwick, 1995, as well as Hoﬀman, McCabe, Shachat and Smith,
1994). Assume that this individual now becomes the allocator in reward allocation
where the monetary amount c to be distributed is the result of some serious eﬀorts
to which he himself contributed only a share s with 0 <s<1/2 w h e r ew ea s s u m e
that all individual eﬀorts are comparable. In our view, such an individual will
answer the ﬁrst question in Figure II.1 by “Yes”, but most likely deny the close
(quantitative) resemblance of reward allocation and his previous experiences with
dictator games. This then leads to the application of the “Adaptation Procedure”
in Figure III.2, especially when, in case of just two individuals, the deviation
| s − 1/2 | from equal contributions is large.
Many will answer the ﬁrst question in Figure III.2 and also the second one by
“Yes”14 since participants in reward allocation experiments with s<1/2 usually
13In reward allocation experiments both individuals ﬁr s th a v et oi n v e s ts o m ee ﬀorts by which
they jointly produce the monetary amount to be allocated among them. Usually they are told
who produced how much. The rules for dividing the joint product are those of dictator giving
(see Footnote 11).
14The “costs” of bad experiences in such a case can be moral ones, e.g. feelings of regret.
22demand only s·c for themselves, a rare behavior in dictator giving with randomly
assigned roles. Such an individual may view the qualitative diﬀerences between
reward allocation and dictator games as too essential to view them as similar.
According to Figure III.2 he then will apply the “New Problem Solver”.
Remark 4.3: Reward allocation and dictator experiments, where one does not
have to engage in strategic considerations in spite of the social decision en-
vironment, will be usually seen as qualitatively diﬀerent (ﬁrst question in
Figure II.1) or as quantitatively dissimilar (ﬁrst question in Figure III.2).
Thus strategic equivalence of two decision environments does not imply the same
cognitive or mental representation what allows for presentation (see Pruitt, 1967)
or framing eﬀects (see Tversky and Kahneman, 1986).
4.4. Ultimatum proposals
Will applying the “New Problem Solver”, described in Figure III.3, to ultimatum
proposals diﬀer from its application to dictator giving? One basic concern of
ultimatum proposers, namely the desire to have one’s proposal accepted, is not
present in dictator games. Naturally the cognitive model will have to account
for this basic concern. In our view, an ultimatum proposer will try to predict
how a typical responder will react. This must not be a complete responder
strategy15. It usually will suﬃce to know some proposals which will surely be
accepted, e.g. the equal split. What a proposer then ﬁnally proposes will depend
on his other concerns. If he is mainly interested in his own well-being, he will
tend to choose the highest almost surely accepted proposal, e.g. by asking for
two thirds of the pie. If, however, by imagining how a responder will react, he
has developed a secondary concern for the responder’s well-being and if the pie
is rather small, he may refrain from any risk of conﬂict and suggest an equal
division.
15A complete responder strategy speciﬁes for every conceivable distribution of the monetary
amount whether it will be accepted or rejected by the responder.
23Thus there may be three basic concerns, the monetary win of the proposer himself,
the probability by which a proposal is accepted, and the well-being or the feelings
of the responder. At least in the usual range of ultimatum oﬀers there is no conﬂict
between the latter two concerns: A greater oﬀer will improve the well-being and
the positive feelings of the responder and also increase the probability that he will
accept the oﬀer. Thus the basic conﬂict of ultimatum proposers is the trade oﬀ
between a higher demand and the eﬀects of an “unfair” oﬀer for the responder.
As we know (see Roth, 1995, for a survey) even a considerable, but nevertheless
unfair oﬀer will not prevent an angry responder from punishing the proposer.
Remark 4.4: During the dynamic process of decision emergence new concerns
may come up. If, for instance, an ultimatum proposer tries to predict
whether the responder will reject an unfair oﬀer, he may develop some sec-
ondary concern for the responder’s well-being.
So the major diﬀerence of the cognitive models in dictator giving and ultimatum
proposing is not the concern for the other player, but only that it has no strategic
aspect in dictator giving, whereas it crucially determines the likelihood of an
agreement in ultimatum proposing. As a consequence a dictator can rely only on
his own feelings of what is just whereas an ultimatum proposer has to take into
account how others react. In view of Figure III.3 one may suﬀer from conﬂicting
basic concerns also in dictator giving. But unlike to the ultimatum game a “bad
experience” is not very costly since the proposal cannot be rejected.
5. Concluding remarks
Our aim was to provide on overall picture how decisions of boundedly rational
decision makers emerge. Any such attempt will suﬀer from two major risks: One
is to aim at a generally applicable algorithm which, however, would be overly
speculative due to our limited knowledge about bounded rationality. To account
for this risk we have restricted the variety of decision problems and have not tried
24to fully specify all details. But, of course, even this did not suﬃce to rule out
speculation.
The other risk is to neglect important facts about boundedly rational decision
behavior. Some important aspects like, for instance, aspiration adjustment (see
Sauermann and Selten, 1959, and Figure III.1) and learning dynamics (e.g. Roth
and Erev, 1995, and Figure III.1) may be captured by our “Learning Module” as
described in Figure III.1. Similarly, other aspects of boundedly rational behavior,
e.g. the theory of cognitive dissonance (see Festinger, 1957, and Frey, 1997), can
be accomodated into our general model, e.g. when specifying how to react to
conﬂicting basic concerns in Figure III.3. But, of course, there are other (social)
psychological and economic ideas which also might have helped to provide an
empirically profound and thus more acceptable model of decision emergence.
If some celebrated concept is not explicitly considered here, it may be at odds with
our general perspective, especially of viewing decision making as a dynamic pro-
cess. Such examples are theories which assume that decision makers know how to
evaluate gains and losses (possibly in view of a given reference point) as it is true
for utility theory or prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Of course,
people must and will evaluate gains and losses and it is often true that losses
count more. But they generally do not have an evaluation function readily avail-
able which they simply can apply. This does not exclude that mature behavior
might look like being generated by such evaluations functions. Nevertheless inex-
perienced decision makers will hardly ever command readily available evaluations
of material and immaterial rewards (and possibly of their probabilities).
A concept which is more implicitly included is that one of a decision frame
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1986) which, in our view, can inﬂuence strongly how
a situation is cognitively perceived. The frame of a decision problem might even
hide true and indicate wrong qualitative resemblance (see Figure II.1). It certainly
inﬂuences which additional causal relationships one considers and whether qual-
itative diﬀerences are seen as essential. But again the dynamics are important:
25Somebody who has repeatedly played the ultimatum game in a neutral frame16
might less likely yield to a “charity frame”o ft h es a m eg a m e 17 as somebody
who confronts such a decision problem for the ﬁrst time.
How can one defend our bold attempt to generally describe boundedly rational
decision emergence although little is known about bounded rationality? The ex-
cuse is that we need to put together the more or less independent pieces of what is
known about bounded rationality and to investigate which of the many possibly
relevant ideas are conceptually consistent and can be combined to provide a more
general perspective.
Other approaches pursuing similar goals (see Holland et al., 1986, for an earlier
one) employ similar ideas. It will ﬁnally be an empirical question which approach
is better. We mainly hope to initiate a mutually fruitful exchange of how to
develop a general framework of boundedly rational decision emergence. We do
not claim to know the ﬁnal answer.
If there is not suﬃcient evidence this does not mean that one is purely speculat-
ing. In the tradition of two former approaches (Güth, 1995 and 2000) some of the
theoretical constructs of our general model can be related to stylized facts of em-
pirically — mostly experimentally — observed boundedly rational decision making.
Of course, one ﬁnally will have to rely on rigorous statistical tests of fundamental
hypotheses. At present there are far too many underlying hypotheses for a pro-
found empirical validation. If other researchers try to locate their research within
such a general framework, this might clarify many aspects and greatly reduce the
degree of speculation about bounded rationality.
16A neutral frame would be that two persons X and Y have to allocate a positive monetary
c amount among themselves by ﬁrst letting X decide which amount y with 0 ≤ y ≤ c he oﬀers
Y a n dt h e na s k i n gY whether he accepts it, i.e. X gets c−y and Y the amount y, or not (both
receive nothing).
17Such a frame could already be triggered by referring to oﬀer y in Footnote 19 as to X’s
donation to Y which Y , however, can reject.
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